How Can Financial Constraints Force a Central Bank to Exit a Currency Peg? An Application to the Swiss Franc Peg

55 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2019 Last revised: 22 Dec 2022

See all articles by Julien Pinter

Julien Pinter

Charles University - Institute of Economic Studies

Marc Pourroy

CRIEF, Université de Poitiers

Date Written: March 26, 2019

Abstract

We analyze how financial constraints can weigh on a central bank's decision to exit a temporary currency peg, such as the one put in place in Switzerland between 2011 and 2015. We show that negative equity or insolvency concerns can force a central bank to exit such a peg earlier than it would have done absent such concerns. We detail under which conditions such reasoning can apply for a traditional inflation-averse central bank. We then build an exchange market pressure model fitting with current peg reality to forecast both the central bank future bond holdings under a peg as well as its future losses. Applying our model to the Swiss franc peg, we show that negative equity concerns could have motivated the Swiss central bank early and puzzling peg exit in 2015, thereby providing a potential explanation for the "Frankenshock". ECB QE policy appears as a potential key driver of this decision. The paper adds to the literature on the limits of foreign exchange interventions for the particular case of central banks fighting appreciation pressures, which is a highly under-researched area.

Keywords: Swiss Franc Peg, Exchange Rate Regime, Exchange Market Pressure, Central Bank Solvency, Central Bank Capital

JEL Classification: E42, E52, E58, F31, F33

Suggested Citation

Pinter, Julien and Pourroy, Marc, How Can Financial Constraints Force a Central Bank to Exit a Currency Peg? An Application to the Swiss Franc Peg (March 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3360443 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3360443

Julien Pinter (Contact Author)

Charles University - Institute of Economic Studies ( email )

Celetná 13
Praha 1, 116 36
Czech Republic

Marc Pourroy

CRIEF, Université de Poitiers ( email )

93 avenue du recteur Pineau
Poitiers, 86000
France

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