I Choose, You Decide: Structural Tools for Supreme Court Legitimation
14 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2019 Last revised: 6 Jun 2019
Date Written: March 26, 2019
Efforts to rein in partisanship (or the perception thereof) on the Supreme Court tend to focus on reforms to the selection, appointment, or tenure of Justices. I propose a different, and perhaps complementary reform, which would not require constitutional amendment. I propose that the selection of a case for the Court’s discretionary appellate docket should be performed by a different group of judicial officers than those who hear and decide that case. The proposal leverages the insight of the “I cut, you choose” procedure for ensuring fair division — only here, it manifests as “I choose, you decide.” This proposal, rather than attempting to correct any supposed institutional deficiency that exacerbates the effects of partisanship, instead seeks to create a structure of checks and balances by pitting partisanship against partisanship.
Keywords: Supreme Court, Federal Courts, Court Reform, I Cut You Choose, Game Theory
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