The Minimal Dominant Set is a Nonempty Core Extension

30 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2002

See all articles by Laszlo A. Koczy

Laszlo A. Koczy

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS); Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Luc Lauwers

KU Leuven

Date Written: June 2003

Abstract

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

Keywords: Core, Non-emptiness, Indirect Dominance, Outsider Independence

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Koczy, Laszlo A. and Lauwers, Luc, The Minimal Dominant Set is a Nonempty Core Extension (June 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 50.2003; Catholic U of Leuven, Econometrics Working Paper No. 05/02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=336160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.336160

Laszlo A. Koczy (Contact Author)

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS) ( email )

Budaörsi 45
Budapest, H-1112
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.mtakti.hu/en/kutatok/laszlo-a-koczy/276/

Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Magyar Tudósok krt. 2.
Budapest, 1117
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://qsms.mokk.bme.hu/index.php/koczy/

Luc Lauwers

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant
Belgium

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