Algorithmic Information Disclosure by Regulators and Competition Authorities

33 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2019

See all articles by Fabiana Di Porto

Fabiana Di Porto

Department of Law and Economics, University of Rome "UnitelmaSapienza"; Luiss Guido Carli University

Mariateresa Maggiolino

Bocconi University - Department of Legal Studies; Ask Research Center

Date Written: March 31, 2019


Also in the digital age, markets work properly as long as consumers are well informed. What is peculiar of the digital age is that consumers have become very fragile, also because firms can extensively manipulate the information that they produce and distribute to markets. Antitrust authorities may find their way to prosecute business manipulative conduct, as some rulings suggest. However, the enforcement of antitrust law is subject to precise circumstances and requires cumbersome proceedings, especially when dominant firms are involved. Therefore, a simpler and more widespread intervention is needed. Although over the years traditional disclosure regulation has showed its limits, today algorithmic analysis gives room to more effective forms of disclosure regulation. Therefore, the paper maintains that both regulators and antitrust authorities can use these new forms of disclosure regulation to perform better their functions. Thanks to algorithmic analysis, (a) regulators can provide consumers with targeted co-regulated disclosures; (b) while competition authorities, using their advocacy powers, can provide trustworthy rankings and reviews about firms’ ability to comply with antitrust and consumer protection laws.

Keywords: information disclosure, antitrust, co-regulation, information asymmetry, big data, digital markets, proportionality, algorithms

JEL Classification: K21, L15, L50, D80

Suggested Citation

Di Porto, Fabiana and Maggiolino, Mariateresa, Algorithmic Information Disclosure by Regulators and Competition Authorities (March 31, 2019). Global Jurist, 2019, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3363169, Available at SSRN: or

Fabiana Di Porto

Department of Law and Economics, University of Rome "UnitelmaSapienza" ( email )


Luiss Guido Carli University

Viale Romania
Rome, Roma 00100

Mariateresa Maggiolino (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Legal Studies ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, Milan 20136

Ask Research Center ( email )

via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136

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