Investor Ideology

78 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2019

See all articles by Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Tao Li

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration

Enrichetta Ravina

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Howard Rosenthal

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2019

Abstract

We estimate institutional investor preferences based on their proxy voting records in publicly listed Russell 3000 firms. We employ a spatial model of proxy voting, the W-NOMINATE method for scaling legislatures, and map institutional investors onto a left-right dimension based on their votes for fiscal year 2012. The far-left are socially responsible and the far-right are "money conscious" investors. Significant ideological differences reflect an absence of shareholder unanimity. The proxy adviser ISS, similar to a political leader, makes voting recommendations that place it in the center; to the left of most mutual funds. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm and fewer executive compensation proposals. A second dimension reflects a more traditional governance view, with management disciplinarian investors, the proxy adviser Glass-Lewis among them, pitted against more management friendly ones.

Keywords: institutional investors, Proxy voting, Socially responsible investment

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Patrick and Li, Tao and Ravina, Enrichetta and Rosenthal, Howard, Investor Ideology (March 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13633, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363546

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Tao Li

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration ( email )

308 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32601
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/tao-li/

Enrichetta Ravina

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/eravina/research

Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

33 Great Sutton Street
London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
Brussels
Belgium

Howard Rosenthal

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States

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