Cheating Pays

65 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2019 Last revised: 13 Jul 2019

Date Written: April 1, 2019


Common private-ordering theories predict that merchants have an incentive to act honestly because if they do not, they will get a bad reputation and their future businesses will suffer. In these theories, cheating is cheating whether the cheat is big or small. But while reputa­tion-based private ordering may constrain the big cheat, it does not necessarily constrain the small cheat because of the difficulty in discover­ing certain types of low-level cheating and the consequent failure of the disciplining power of reputation. Yet the small cheat presents a signifi­cant challenge to modern contracting, both between businesses and in the contracts of adhesion imposed on consumers. To encourage private law scholars to address the unique governance challenges posed by low-level cheating, this Essay describes the conditions under which low-level cheating can flourish and become widespread. It demonstrates this so-called “Cheating Pays” scenario using a historical case study in which a seventeenth-century London grocer, trading under precisely those condi­tions that private-ordering theories predict will incentivize honesty, not only cheated extensively but also successfully remained in business after having been caught and publicly punished. Identifying the scenarios in which cheating pays has implications for how firms use contracts and how consumers might use the courts to try to reduce opportunistic behavior.

Suggested Citation

Kadens, Emily, Cheating Pays (April 1, 2019). 119 Columbia Law Review 527 (2019), Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 19-12, Available at SSRN:

Emily Kadens (Contact Author)

Northwestern University School of Law ( email )

600 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, IL 60601
United States

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