Internet Appendix of 'Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value'

20 Pages Posted: 2 May 2019 Last revised: 9 Oct 2020

See all articles by Martijn Cremers

Martijn Cremers

University of Notre Dame; ECGI

Scott Guernsey

University of Tennessee - Department of Finance

Simone M. Sepe

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law; University of Toulouse 1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: December 27, 2019

Abstract

This internet appendix provides supplemental results as described in our paper "Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value", available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299889

Keywords: Stakeholder orientation, antitakeover statutes, firm value, bonding

JEL Classification: G32, G34, K22, O32

Suggested Citation

Cremers, K. J. Martijn and Guernsey, Scott and Sepe, Simone M., Internet Appendix of 'Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value' (December 27, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3363686

K. J. Martijn Cremers (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame ( email )

P.O. Box 399
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
United States

ECGI ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Scott Guernsey

University of Tennessee - Department of Finance ( email )

Haslam College of Business
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States

Simone M. Sepe

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States

University of Toulouse 1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole ( email )

2 Rue du Doyen-Gabriel-Marty
Toulouse, 31042
France

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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