Reorienting Disclosure Debates in a Post-Citizens United World

Democracy by the People: Reforming Campaign Finance in America (2019)

Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 568

20 Pages Posted: 3 May 2019

See all articles by Katherine Shaw

Katherine Shaw

University of Pennsylvania - Carey Law School; Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Date Written: January 17, 2019

Abstract

Disclosure is often an afterthought in debates about money in politics. Reformers have tended to take disclosure for granted, devoting little time to developing and refining the affirmative case for it. They have also tended to assume that the current disclosure regime is an effective one, at least as far as it goes. Reformers have devoted substantial attention to the holes in the current regime in the post-Citizens United era— so-called “dark” and “gray” money — and have considered ways to bring such activity into the light. Yet even if they are successful, such expansion efforts would only bring more dollars under the auspices of a disclosure regime in need of both stronger conceptual architecture and substantial practical improvements. So closing the gaps in the system is only one aspect of the task.

This chapter surveys the doctrine, practice, and empirics of disclosure. It then offers a number of proposals for reforming the reach, quality, and impact of this mode of campaign finance regulation.

Keywords: campaign finance, disclosure

Suggested Citation

Shaw, Katherine, Reorienting Disclosure Debates in a Post-Citizens United World (January 17, 2019). Democracy by the People: Reforming Campaign Finance in America (2019), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 568, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365296

Katherine Shaw (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )

55 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
United States

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