Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law

31 Pages Posted: 3 May 2019

See all articles by Suresh Naidu

Suresh Naidu

Columbia University

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: January 13, 2019

Abstract

Recent literature has suggested that antitrust regulation is an appropriate response to labor market monopsony. This article qualifies the primacy of antitrust by arguing that a significant degree of labor market power is “frictional,” that is, without artificial barriers to entry or excessive concentration of employment. If monopsony is pervasive under conditions of laissez-faire, antitrust is likely to play only a partial role in remedying it, and other legal and policy instruments to intervene in the labor market will be required.

Keywords: antitrust; employment law; labor monopsony

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Naidu, Suresh and Posner, Eric A., Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law (January 13, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365374 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3365374

Suresh Naidu

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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