Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence

31 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2019

See all articles by Sebastian Galiani

Sebastian Galiani

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Cheryl Xiaoning Long

Xiamen University

Camila Navajas Ahumada

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - UC San Diego

Gustavo Torrens

Indiana university

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2019

Abstract

We experimentally explore the connections between horizontal conflict of interests (citizens have heterogeneous preferences over collective decisions) and vertical conflict of interests (agents in charge of implementing collective decisions earn political rents). We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common‐agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents. Our findings have important implications. At the macro level, they help explaining the persistence of corruption in very unequal societies. At the micro level, our findings suggest that anti‐corruption programs should allocate more resources (e.g., inspectors and auditors) to areas with intense horizontal conflicts.

Suggested Citation

Galiani, Sebastian and Long, Cheryl Xiaoning and Navajas Ahumada, Camila and Torrens, Gustavo, Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence (May 2019). Kyklos, Vol. 72, Issue 2, pp. 239-269, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3366477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12201

Sebastian Galiani (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Cheryl Xiaoning Long

Xiamen University ( email )

Xiamen, Fujian 361005
China

Camila Navajas Ahumada

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - UC San Diego ( email )

9500 Gilman Dr., 0519
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States

Gustavo Torrens

Indiana university ( email )

Wylie Hall, 100 S Woodland Ave
Bloomington, IN 47405-7104
United States
8128568131 (Phone)
47405-7104 (Fax)

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