Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act

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See all articles by Haelim Anderson

Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Selman Erol

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Guillermo Ordoñez

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 5, 2019

Abstract

Central banks provide public liquidity (through lending facilities and promises of bailouts) with the intent to stabilize the financial system. Even though this provision is restricted to member (regulated) banks, an interbank system can provide indirect access to nonmember (shadow) banks. We construct a model to understand how a banking network may change in the presence of central bank interventions and how those changes affect financial fragility. We provide evidence showing that the introduction of the Fed’s liquidity provision in 1913 increased systemic risk through three channels; it reduced aggregate liquidity, created a new source of financial contagion, and crowded out private insurance for smoothing cross-regional liquidity shocks (manifested through the geographic concentration of networks).

Keywords: Dual banking system, Federal Reserve Act, Shadow Banking, Interbank Networks, Systemic Risk

JEL Classification: G20, E50, N22

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Haelim and Erol, Selman and Ordoñez, Guillermo, Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act (April 5, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ( email )

550 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20429
United States

Selman Erol (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Guillermo Ordoñez

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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