Single Resolution Board: Another Meroni Extension or Another Chapter to Europe's Constitutional Transformation?

17 Pages Posted: 8 May 2019

See all articles by Ioannis Asimakopoulos

Ioannis Asimakopoulos

Universite du Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance

Date Written: December 10, 2018

Abstract

The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has pushed the constitutional boundaries of agencification further. After elaborating on the SRB’s powers and safeguards, one can argue that its governance structure combined with its policymaking powers distinguish the SRB from all other agencies. While trying to assess its legality of establishment and empowerment, this paper seeks to identify the nature of the empowerment, whether Meroni is still fit for purpose, and whether the limits of institutional balance have been bent or indeed broken. After expressing concerns as to the SRB’s compliance with the current EU institutional framework, the paper offers an alternative for exiting this constitutional deadlock by applying Weiler’s theory of constitutional transformation. Such a solution would legitimize the SRB as well as facilitate the functioning of Banking Union.

Suggested Citation

Asimakopoulos, Ioannis, Single Resolution Board: Another Meroni Extension or Another Chapter to Europe's Constitutional Transformation? (December 10, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367559 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3367559

Ioannis Asimakopoulos (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance ( email )

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Luxembourg-Limpertsberg
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