Cryptocurrency and Double Spending History: Transactions with Zero Confirmation

53 Pages Posted: 8 May 2019 Last revised: 2 Dec 2021

Date Written: August 21, 2019

Abstract

We develop a general equilibrium model of cryptocurrency to study a double spending prevention mechanism without payment confirmations. Agents trade cryptocurrency using a digital wallet, and the cryptocurrency system provides a means to verify a wallet's double spending history. A digital wallet may obtain a good reputation for no double spending attempts based on its transaction history. If a buyer makes a payment with a digital wallet that does not have a good reputation, sellers provide goods after payment confirmations in the blockchain to prevent a double spending attack. On the other hand, sellers deliver goods immediately without payment confirmations if the payment is made through a digital wallet with a good reputation as long as the cost of losing a good reputation outweighs the short-run gain from double spending. As the time required for each confirmation increases, the utility loss from delayed delivery of goods increases so double spending incentives decrease.

Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Delivery Lag, Double Spending, Trade History

JEL Classification: D86, E40, E50, G10

Suggested Citation

Kang, Kee-Youn, Cryptocurrency and Double Spending History: Transactions with Zero Confirmation (August 21, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3369306

Kee-Youn Kang (Contact Author)

Yonsei University ( email )

50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu
Seoul, 120-749
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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