Horizontal Shareholding within the European Competition Law Framework: Discussion of the Proposed Solutions

European Competition Law Review, 40 (6) (2019)

19 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2019

See all articles by Riccardo Fadiga

Riccardo Fadiga

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer - Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

The literature shows that horizontal shareholding engenders significant anticompetitive effects and that no suitable instrument exists within European competition law which reliably and effectively can be applied to curtail such intrinsic effects. This Article analyses several proposals which have been put forward by the scholarship and the institutions in order to compare and contrast their advantages and disadvantages, and shows that enforcement against horizontal shareholding on the basis of Article 102 TFEU affords substantial benefits compared to other solutions, with no comparable disadvantages.

Keywords: Antitrust, horizontal shareholding, common ownership, common shareholding, institutional investors, passive investment, article 102, European Commission

JEL Classification: D21, D43, G23, G32, K21, K22, L10, L13, L21, L22, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Fadiga, Riccardo, Horizontal Shareholding within the European Competition Law Framework: Discussion of the Proposed Solutions (2019). European Competition Law Review, 40 (6) (2019), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369737

Riccardo Fadiga (Contact Author)

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer - Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP ( email )

Piazza del Popolo 18
Rome, Rome 00187
Italy

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