Equity Allocation and Risk-Taking in the Intermediation Chain

68 Pages Posted: 8 May 2019

See all articles by Anatoli Segura

Anatoli Segura

Bank of Italy

Alonso Villacorta

Stanford University; UC Santa Cruz

Date Written: January 2019


We build an equilibrium model of the capital structure and risk-taking in the originate-to-distribute intermediation chain in presence of absolute demand for safety by some investors and limited endowment by equity investors. Loan originators may expand investment by raising funds from intermediaries that diversify idiosyncratic risks to create safe securitized assets. Equity funding allows originators to improve their risk-taking incentives and intermediaries to absorb losses from their exposure to aggregate risk. The competitive allocation of equity renders the equilibrium Pareto constrained efficient. Consistent with the saving glut narrative of the expansion of securitization in the run-up to the crisis, an increase in the demand for safety leads to increases in the overall equity invested in intermediaries, the relative size of the intermediary sector and risk-taking at origination. Government policies that include fiscally neutral guarantees to the issuance of securitized assets lead to Pareto improvements in the economy, have ambiguous risk-taking effects at origination, and are preferable to guarantees to originators because of intermediaries' higher exposure to aggregate risk.

Keywords: capital structure, risk-taking, originate-to-distribute, diversification, spreads, saving glut

JEL Classification: G01, G20, G28

Suggested Citation

Segura, Anatoli and Villacorta, Luis Alonso and Villacorta, Luis Alonso, Equity Allocation and Risk-Taking in the Intermediation Chain (January 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3370065

Anatoli Segura (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184

Luis Alonso Villacorta

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

UC Santa Cruz ( email )

Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States

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