The Liability of Public Authorities: An Economic Analysis

In The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, ed. K. Oliphant (in the series Principles of European Tort Law), 2017.

32 Pages Posted: 20 May 2019

See all articles by De Mot Jef

De Mot Jef

Hasselt University

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Traditional economic analysis of accident law has largely focused on individual utility maximising actors as potential injurers and victims. On that basis a huge literature has been developed since the early publications of Calabresi in the 1960's explaining under which conditions particular liability rules may be effective in promoting social welfare. Moreover, the theoretical assumptions made in the literature have increasingly been met with empirical support. However, less attention has been paid to the situation where the tortfeasor is not an individual actor or a commercial enterprise, but rather a public authority. Only relatively recently have some articles started to explore public authority liability. The goal of our contribution is to provide an overview of this literature.

Keywords: public authority liability, state liability, economic analysis

Suggested Citation

Jef, De Mot and Faure, Michael G., The Liability of Public Authorities: An Economic Analysis (2016). In The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, ed. K. Oliphant (in the series Principles of European Tort Law), 2017., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372245

De Mot Jef (Contact Author)

Hasselt University ( email )

Agoralaan - building D
Gebouw D
Diepenbeek, 3590
Belgium

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

PO Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 - 43 - 388 30 60 (Phone)
+31 - 43 - 325 90 91 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelfaure.be

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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