CEO Education and the Ability to Raise Capital

Gounopoulos, D., Loukopoulos, G., and Loukopoulos, P. 2020. CEO Education and the Ability to Raise Capital. Corporate Governance: An International Review. doi: 10.1111/corg.12338

70 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2019 Last revised: 24 Aug 2020

Date Written: August 13, 2020

Abstract

We find that Initial Public Offering (IPO) firms led by CEOs with superior educational credentials — in terms of level and quality — are associated with lower levels of IPO underpricing. This association is mainly driven by CEOs that hold advanced degrees. Notably, a difference-in-difference approach based on two quasi-natural experiments indicates that the impact of CEO education on IPO underpricing is more pronounced within environments characterized by lower information transparency. The baseline results also hold in the longer term, thereby confirming the value of signaling prestigious academic awards at the time of the IPO.

Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Underpricing, CEO Education Characteristics, Post-IPO Performance

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G39

Suggested Citation

Gounopoulos, Dimitrios and Loukopoulos, Georgios and Loukopoulos, Panagiotis, CEO Education and the Ability to Raise Capital (August 13, 2020). Gounopoulos, D., Loukopoulos, G., and Loukopoulos, P. 2020. CEO Education and the Ability to Raise Capital. Corporate Governance: An International Review. doi: 10.1111/corg.12338, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373796 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373796

Dimitrios Gounopoulos

University of Bath ( email )

School of Management,
Wessex House, Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

Georgios Loukopoulos (Contact Author)

The Open University ( email )

Walton Hall
Milton Keynes, MK6 7AA
United Kingdom

Panagiotis Loukopoulos

University of Strathclyde ( email )

Curran Building
100 Cathedral Street
Glasgow G4 0LN
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
138
Abstract Views
964
rank
285,756
PlumX Metrics