Matching Markets via Descending Price

16 Pages Posted: 17 May 2019

See all articles by Bo Waggoner

Bo Waggoner

Microsoft Research New York City; U. of Colorado, Boulder

E. Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research New York City; RadicalxChange Foundation

Date Written: April 17, 2019

Abstract

A market for matching participants with each other, such as buyers and sellers of labor, faces two challenges: efficiently coordinating information acquisition processes such as job interviews; and efficiently coordinating high-value matches. We propose a general descending-price market design called the Marshallian Match. In contrast to existing ascending or deferred-acceptance style proposals, the descending-price design is compatible with optimal search theory, allowing it to address both challenges.

Keywords: matching markets, descending price, market design, mechanism design

Suggested Citation

Waggoner, Bo and Weyl, Eric Glen, Matching Markets via Descending Price (April 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373934

Bo Waggoner (Contact Author)

Microsoft Research New York City ( email )

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U. of Colorado, Boulder ( email )

1070 Edinboro Drive
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Eric Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research New York City ( email )

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New York, NY 10011
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8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

RadicalxChange Foundation ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.radicalxchange.org

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