Matching Markets via Descending Price

16 Pages Posted: 17 May 2019

See all articles by Bo Waggoner

Bo Waggoner

Microsoft Research New York City; U. of Colorado, Boulder

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Date Written: April 17, 2019


A market for matching participants with each other, such as buyers and sellers of labor, faces two challenges: efficiently coordinating information acquisition processes such as job interviews; and efficiently coordinating high-value matches. We propose a general descending-price market design called the Marshallian Match. In contrast to existing ascending or deferred-acceptance style proposals, the descending-price design is compatible with optimal search theory, allowing it to address both challenges.

Keywords: matching markets, descending price, market design, mechanism design

Suggested Citation

Waggoner, Bo and Weyl, Eric Glen, Matching Markets via Descending Price (April 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: or

Bo Waggoner (Contact Author)

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Eric Glen Weyl

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Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

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