Verifying Identity as a Social Intersection

20 Pages Posted: 20 May 2019

See all articles by Nicole Immorlica

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

E. Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research New York City; RadicalxChange Foundation; Princeton University - Julis Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy and Finance

Date Written: April 20, 2019

Abstract

Most existing digital identity solutions are either centralized (e.g., national identity cards) or individualistic (e.g., most “self-sovereign” identity proposals). Outside of digital life, however, identity is typically social (for instance, “individual” data such as birthdate is shared with parents) and intersectional (viz., different data and trust are shared with different others). We formalize these ideas to provide a more robust and realistic framework for decentralized identity. We build upon the concepts web-of-trust and social collateral, from cryptography and economics, to provide a system of defining, verifying, and making use of identity through networks. We exploit the redundancy created by intersectionality together with the fragmentation of identity suggested by self-sovereign schemes to minimize social collateral required for verification. We exploit the probabilistic structure of Bloom filters to provide uniqueness proofs to prevent Sybil attacks while conveying minimal compromising information to verifiers. We discuss applications to “proof-of-personhood” blockchains and Radical Markets.

Keywords: Identity, Decentralized Identity, Social Identity, Intersectional, Network, Web of Trust, Privacy, Cybersecurity, Blockchain, Proof-of-Personhood, Social Collateral

JEL Classification: D85, Z13, P48

Suggested Citation

Immorlica, Nicole and Jackson, Matthew O. and Weyl, Eric Glen, Verifying Identity as a Social Intersection (April 20, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375436 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3375436

Nicole Immorlica

Microsoft Research ( email )

One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Eric Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research New York City ( email )

641 Avenue of the Americas
7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

RadicalxChange Foundation ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.radicalxchange.org

Princeton University - Julis Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy and Finance ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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