Audience and Other-Regarding Effects in an Experimental Auction With Bribery

24 Pages Posted: 21 May 2019

See all articles by Aurora García-Gallego

Aurora García-Gallego

Universitat Jaume I

Nikos Georgantzis

Burgundy School of Business

Tarek Jaber-Lopez

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Georgia Michailidou

New York University (NYU) - New York University, Abu Dhabi

Date Written: April 23, 2019

Abstract

We report results from an experimental set up in which two firms compete in an auction to win the license for a public project, submitting sealed offers regarding the project’s quality and a bribe to the public official deciding. We study the role of an agent (citizen) who is either a mere observer or is passively affected by the quality of the winning project. Experimental data reveal that the existence of a citizen affected by the winning project significantly reduces bribes, while a citizen who only observes the auction results in higher pro-social behaviour from public officials.

Keywords: Corruption, bribery, experiment

JEL Classification: D73, C91, Z13

Suggested Citation

García-Gallego, Aurora and Georgantzis, Nikos and Jaber-Lopez, Tarek and Michailidou, Georgia, Audience and Other-Regarding Effects in an Experimental Auction With Bribery (April 23, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3376728

Aurora García-Gallego

Universitat Jaume I ( email )

Campus del Riu Sec
Castellón, 12071
Spain

Nikos Georgantzis

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

Tarek Jaber-Lopez (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Georgia Michailidou

New York University (NYU) - New York University, Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

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