Active vs. Passive: Information Acquisition in the Presence of Corporate Governance

65 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2019 Last revised: 11 Feb 2022

See all articles by Paula Cocoma

Paula Cocoma

INSEAD - Finance

Jinyuan Zhang

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Date Written: November 20, 2021

Abstract

We provide a theoretical framework to understand the implications of corporate governance for the composition of the asset management industry. We allow investors to implement corporate governance in an otherwise standard information model. Our model generates new strategic complementarities in investors’ decisions to acquire information due to a conflict of interest when implementing corporate governance. Such strategic complementarities increase the proportion of passive investors in equilibrium, rationalizing the rising share of passive investment. Our results are robust to the various corporate governance approaches that passive investors take, and we provide a policy discussion on such approaches. Moreover, in our model, a rise in passive investment can increase both payoff volatility and price informativeness. We conclude with two relevant extensions to critical passive funds’ corporate governance issues: ESG policies and product market competition.

Keywords: mutual funds, passive investment, corporate governance, information acquisition, strate- gic complementarities, conflict of interests

Suggested Citation

Cocoma, Paula and Zhang, Jinyuan, Active vs. Passive: Information Acquisition in the Presence of Corporate Governance (November 20, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3379325

Paula Cocoma (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Finance ( email )

France

Jinyuan Zhang

UCLA Anderson School of Management ( email )

Los Angeles, CA
United States

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