Activist-appointed Directors

We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.

Keywords: Activist independent directors, Activist shareholder, Monitoring, Firm value, Announcement return, Director voting, Director labor market

JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Kang, Jun-Koo and Kim, Hyemin and Kim, Jungmin and Low, Angie, Activist-appointed Directors (April 21, 2020). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3380837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3380837