Bots Against Bots: The Use of Political Bots As an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
4 Pages Posted: 29 May 2019
Date Written: May 1, 2019
This paper analyzes the use of political bots in terms of evolutionary game theory. We study a population where there are two kinds of politicians. The first kind corresponds to politicians that employ bot accounts, whereas the second corresponds to politicians that prefer a more personal interaction (i.e. without relying on bots). We show that using bots is an evolutionarily stable strategy. The predicted outcome of this game implies that we can expect a world of increasing noise, with growing armies of bots at the disposal of politicians and eruptions of fake news disseminated by bots.
Keywords: Bots, Evolutionary game theory
JEL Classification: C70, C73, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation