Bots Against Bots: The Use of Political Bots As an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

4 Pages Posted: 29 May 2019

See all articles by Erick Limas

Erick Limas

Free University of Berlin (FUB), Institute for Latin American Studies, School of Business & Economics

Date Written: May 1, 2019

Abstract

This paper analyzes the use of political bots in terms of evolutionary game theory. We study a population where there are two kinds of politicians. The first kind corresponds to politicians that employ bot accounts, whereas the second corresponds to politicians that prefer a more personal interaction (i.e. without relying on bots). We show that using bots is an evolutionarily stable strategy. The predicted outcome of this game implies that we can expect a world of increasing noise, with growing armies of bots at the disposal of politicians and eruptions of fake news disseminated by bots.

Keywords: Bots, Evolutionary game theory

JEL Classification: C70, C73, D72

Suggested Citation

Limas, Erick, Bots Against Bots: The Use of Political Bots As an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (May 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3380985 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3380985

Erick Limas (Contact Author)

Free University of Berlin (FUB), Institute for Latin American Studies, School of Business & Economics ( email )

Boltzmannstrasse 20
Berlin, 14195
Germany

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