Cross-Border Cooperation Between Securities Regulators

69 Pages Posted: 20 May 2019 Last revised: 12 Feb 2020

See all articles by Roger Silvers

Roger Silvers

University of Utah; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: May 2, 2019

Abstract

The events of September 11, 2001, prompted sweeping cross-border coordination efforts for securities regulators around the globe. After 9/11, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) forged a nonbinding arrangement—the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU)—that standardized the protocol for information sharing among participating securities regulators. Because regulators from different countries entered the MMoU at different times, their enlistments created a set of staggered shocks. I use these shocks to show that the resulting cross-border cooperation (a) increases cross-border enforcement and (b) reduces the cost of liquidity provision in the capital markets of participating countries. These results support the conclusion that the MMoU helps fill gaps in cross-border regulation that historically exposed investors to information asymmetry, agency costs, and expropriation risks.

Keywords: cross border, information sharing, networks, regulatory cooperation, enforcement

JEL Classification: K22, G38, F22, F23, F59, M48

Suggested Citation

Silvers, Roger, Cross-Border Cooperation Between Securities Regulators (May 2, 2019). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3381887 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3381887

Roger Silvers (Contact Author)

University of Utah ( email )

1655 E Campus Dr
SLC, UT 01003
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.rogersilvers.com/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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