Private Protection and Public Policing

35 Pages Posted: 7 May 2019

See all articles by Ross D. Hickey

Ross D. Hickey

Simon Fraser University (SFU)

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Joanne Roberts

University of Toronto - Department of Economics

Tanguy Van Ypersele

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 1, 2019

Abstract

This paper looks carefully at situations in which public and private protection are complementary, that is, when private protection must be coordinated with public protection to be effective. For example, home alarms deter theft by being connected to a local police station: if the police do not respond to a home alarm, the home alarm on its own is virtually useless in halting a crime in action. We make a distinction between gross and net complementarity and substitution, where the latter takes into account the effect on the crime rate. We show that when public and private protection are complements the optimal provision of public protection trades offs the manipulation effect of encouraging private protection with the compensatory effect of providing protection to households that do not privately invest. We discuss the implications of our results for policy and empirical research in this area.

Keywords: crime, private protection, policing, externalities

JEL Classification: H41, H42, K42

Suggested Citation

Hickey, Ross D. and Mongrain, Steeve and Roberts, Joanne and Van Ypersele, Tanguy, Private Protection and Public Policing (March 1, 2019). Melbourne Institute Working Paper No. 04/19 (2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383268 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383268

Ross D. Hickey (Contact Author)

Simon Fraser University (SFU) ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604-291-3547 (Phone)
604-291-5944 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sfu.ca/~mongrain/

Joanne Roberts

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
Canada

Tanguy Van Ypersele

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2 rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France
+33 4 4293 5983 (Phone)
+33 4 4293 0968 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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