Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences Without Deception

40 Pages Posted: 7 May 2019

See all articles by Judd B. Kessler

Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Corinne Low

University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: May 2019

Abstract

We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Suggested Citation

Kessler, Judd B. and Low, Corinne, Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences Without Deception (May 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25800, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383299

Judd B. Kessler (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1671/

Corinne Low

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
148
PlumX Metrics