Election Timings under Globalization: A Tax Competition Approach

10 Pages Posted: 30 May 2019

Date Written: May 6, 2019

Abstract

This paper examines how the results of elections in a country are affected by their relative timing. Particularly, I focus on the types of policymakers in terms of capital endowment for the framework of strategic delegation under tax competition. The game is composed of three stages: i) an election is held in the first-mover country and a policymaker is chosen by majority voting; ii) similarly, an election to choose a policymaker is held in the second-mover country; and iii) capital tax rates are simultaneously determined by the policymakers of both countries. As a result, it is indicated that the policymaker elected through voting by citizens in the first-mover country is likely to be less capital-rich, or relatively more left-winged, compared to that in the second-mover country. However, when income disparity within country is sufficiently large, the second-mover country becomes more redistributive.

Keywords: Election timing, Sequential game, Tax competition

JEL Classification: D72, H30, H87

Suggested Citation

Susa, Taiki, Election Timings under Globalization: A Tax Competition Approach (May 6, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383324

Taiki Susa (Contact Author)

Chubu University ( email )

Kasugai, Aichi
Japan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
275
PlumX Metrics