Corporate Governance and the Political Economy of the Company

In Beate Sjåfjell and Christopher M. Bruner (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming).

University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019-12

Posted: 8 May 2019

See all articles by Lorraine E. Talbot

Lorraine E. Talbot

University of York - York Law School; University of Birmingham - Birmingham Law School

Date Written: May 6, 2019

Abstract

This chapter argues that the legal architecture of the company obfuscates the political relationship between shareholders and employees and transforms captured value from employees into a transferable and fungible property form. It sets out this claim within a Marxian analysis of the political economy mapped onto the legal architecture of the company. Following on from this analysis, the chapter also demonstrates that recent initiatives that exhort shareholders to govern the company and to monitor company executives – through, for example, the rapidly proliferating Stewardship Codes – attempt to subvert the legal and economic nature of modern shareholders as rentiers, to ill effect.

Keywords: shareholder governance, exploitation, Marxism, stewardship, value capture

Suggested Citation

Talbot, Lorraine E., Corporate Governance and the Political Economy of the Company (May 6, 2019). In Beate Sjåfjell and Christopher M. Bruner (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming).; University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383411

Lorraine E. Talbot (Contact Author)

University of York - York Law School ( email )

University of York
Heslington, York YO10
United Kingdom

University of Birmingham - Birmingham Law School ( email )

Edgbaston
Birmingham, AL B15 2TT
United Kingdom

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