Conflicts and Coalitions: The Drivers of European Corporate Sustainability Reforms

In Beate Sjåfjell and Christopher M. Bruner (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming).

University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019-47

Posted: 8 May 2019

Date Written: May 6, 2019

Abstract

Traditionally, corporate governance debates have contrasted models based on the principle of shareholder primacy with others taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, such as organised labour. This chapter argues that a new corporate governance compromise is emerging, particularly in Europe, driven by responsible investors, civil society and organised labour, which might offer a new way of overcoming the shareholder versus stakeholder dispute. This emerging NGOs-Investor-Union nexus is illustrated using various examples of recent regulatory initiatives: the EU Non-financial Reporting Directive; the Dutch Banking Sector Agreement regarding human rights; the UK Modern Slavery Act and the French Law on the ‘duty of vigilance’. The chapter draws on the abovementioned cases to elaborate some conjectures on the implications and limitations of this dynamic and fragile convergence of interests for policy-makers and existing debates on sustainable corporate governance reforms.

Keywords: EU regulation, non-financial reporting, modern slavery, Corporate Social Responsibility

Suggested Citation

Monciardini, David, Conflicts and Coalitions: The Drivers of European Corporate Sustainability Reforms (May 6, 2019). In Beate Sjåfjell and Christopher M. Bruner (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming). ; University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2019-47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383563

David Monciardini (Contact Author)

University of Milan ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

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