Auction Design Influences Efficiency: California’s Consignment Mechanism in Perspective

International Association for Energy Economics Energy Forum, Forthcoming

3 Pages Posted: 30 May 2019

See all articles by Noah Dormady

Noah Dormady

John Glenn College of Public Affairs

Date Written: April 12, 2019

Abstract

Noah Dormady discusses how auction rules and mechanisms can influence the efficiency of auctions. He provides a concise summary of recently-published research on carbon auctions with a focus on California’s consignment mechanism, noting that the consignment mechanism has been observed to distort auction efficiency.

Keywords: Auction Efficiency; Cap-and-Trade; Carbon Auction; Energy Auctions

Suggested Citation

Dormady, Noah, Auction Design Influences Efficiency: California’s Consignment Mechanism in Perspective (April 12, 2019). International Association for Energy Economics Energy Forum, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383610 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383610

Noah Dormady (Contact Author)

John Glenn College of Public Affairs ( email )

110 Page Hall
1810 College Road
Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
8
Abstract Views
82
PlumX Metrics