The Economics and Antitrust of Bundling

Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law, Forthcoming

30 Pages Posted: 30 May 2019 Last revised: 11 Jan 2020

See all articles by Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

Washington Finance and Economics; Johns Hopkins University

Date Written: January 10, 2020


This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple examples to show how variation in consumer valuations explains bundling and is not anticompetitive. Finally, I explore other business judgment rule explanations for bundling.

Keywords: Pure and Mixed Bundles, Demand Complementarities, Economies of Scope, Price Discrimination, Tie-In, Correlation of Demand, Antitrust Litigation, Monopoly Power, Lerner Index, NCAA v. Board of Regents

JEL Classification: D21, D42, D43, L12, L13, L40, L41, L50

Suggested Citation

Bhattacharya, Rajeev, The Economics and Antitrust of Bundling (January 10, 2020). Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: or

Rajeev Bhattacharya (Contact Author)

Washington Finance and Economics ( email )

United States


Johns Hopkins University

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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