Why Sound Law and Economics Should Guide Competition Policy in the Digital Economy

ICLE Working Paper, 30 September 2018

13 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2019

See all articles by Dirk Auer

Dirk Auer

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE)

Geoffrey A. Manne

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE)

Aurelien Portuese

Information Technology and Innovation Foundation; George Mason University

Thibault Schrepel

VU University Amsterdam; Stanford University's Codex Center; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Sciences Po

Date Written: September 30, 2018

Abstract

In our submission, we argue that competition policy in the digital economy should be based on sound, theoretical underpinnings and rigorous, evidence-based analysis, best encapsulated in the “law and economics” approach. Despite many expressed fears to the contrary, digital markets are not inherently prone to anti-competitive behavior, and the weight of economic theory and evidence offer little support for the asserted risk of harm. We thus argue that competition intervention should take into account the uncertainty of harm, the presence of countervailing benefits and the problems of devising an effective remedy.

Suggested Citation

Auer, Dirk and Manne, Geoffrey and Portuese, Aurélien and Schrepel, Thibault, Why Sound Law and Economics Should Guide Competition Policy in the Digital Economy (September 30, 2018). ICLE Working Paper, 30 September 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384405 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384405

Dirk Auer

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

5005 SW Meadows Rd.
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United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://laweconcenter.org/author/dirkauer/

Geoffrey Manne (Contact Author)

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

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Suite 300
Portland, OR 97209
United States
503-770-0076 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.laweconcenter.org

Aurélien Portuese

Information Technology and Innovation Foundation ( email )

1101 K Street N.W.
Suite 610
Washington, DC 20005
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://itif.org/issues/regulation-and-antitrust

George Mason University ( email )

United States

Thibault Schrepel

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Stanford University's Codex Center ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

France

Sciences Po ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

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