Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-016

61 Pages Posted: 23 May 2019

See all articles by Riccardo Ghidoni

Riccardo Ghidoni

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management & Statistics

S. Suetens

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: May 6, 2019

Abstract

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings.

Keywords: cooperation, infinitely repeated game, sequential prisoner’s dilemma, strategic uncertainty, experiment

JEL Classification: C70, C90, D70

Suggested Citation

Ghidoni, Riccardo and Suetens, S., Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games (May 6, 2019). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384725 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384725

Riccardo Ghidoni (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University of Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management & Statistics ( email )

Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milano
Milano, 20126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unimib.it/riccardo-ghidoni

S. Suetens

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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