A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems

33 Pages Posted: 9 May 2019 Last revised: 14 Jun 2019

See all articles by Maciej H. Kotowski

Maciej H. Kotowski

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: May 6, 2019


Many two-sided matching situations involve multiperiod interaction. Traditional cooperative solutions, such as stability and the core, often identify unintuitive outcomes (or are empty) when applied to such markets. As an alternative, this study proposes the criterion of perfect a stability. An outcome is perfect a-stable if no coalition prefers an alternative assignment in any period that is superior for all plausible market continuations. Behaviorally, the solution combines foresight about the future and a robust evaluation of contemporaneous outcomes. A perfect a-stable matching exists, even when preferences exhibit intertemporal complementarities. A stronger solution, the perfect a-core, is also investigated. Extensions to markets with arrivals and departures, transferable utility, and many-to-one assignments are proposed.

Keywords: Matching, Two-sided Market, Stability, Core

JEL Classification: C78, C71, D47

Suggested Citation

Kotowski, Maciej H., A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems (May 6, 2019). HKS Working Paper No. RWP19-016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384807 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3384807

Maciej H. Kotowski (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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