Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games

125 Pages Posted: 10 May 2019

See all articles by Takuo Sugaya

Takuo Sugaya

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Yuichi Yamamoto

University of Pennsylvania; Harvard University

Date Written: April 26, 2019

Abstract

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.

Keywords: repeated game, private monitoring, incomplete information, ex-post equilibrium, individual learning

JEL Classification: C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Sugaya, Takuo and Yamamoto, Yuichi, Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games (April 26, 2019). PIER Working Paper No. 19-008 ; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 19-25. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3385516

Takuo Sugaya

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Yuichi Yamamoto (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
200
PlumX Metrics