Correlation Neglect in Voting Decisions: An Experiment

23 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019 Last revised: 21 Aug 2019

See all articles by Johannes Moser

Johannes Moser

University Regensburg

Niklas Wallmeier

University of Hamburg

Date Written: May 12, 2019

Abstract

We investigate the influence of correlation neglect on information aggregation when a voter has to weigh external information against her preferences. In an online experiment, the subjects have to vote on either a safe or a risky payment of the same expected value for their society. The voters receive either one or two signals providing a hint about which alternative may yield a bonus or a penalty for each member once implemented. Our findings suggest that, in line with theoretical evidence, information aggregation may be improved by correlation neglect since it reduces uninformed voting.

Keywords: correlation neglect, voting, bounded rationality

JEL Classification: D72, D83, C90

Suggested Citation

Moser, Johannes and Wallmeier, Niklas, Correlation Neglect in Voting Decisions: An Experiment (May 12, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3386981 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3386981

Johannes Moser (Contact Author)

University Regensburg ( email )

Regensburg
Germany

Niklas Wallmeier

University of Hamburg ( email )

Hamburg
Germany

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