Persuasion on Networks

40 Pages Posted: 13 May 2019 Last revised: 16 Aug 2020

See all articles by Georgy Egorov

Georgy Egorov

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; NBER

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2019

Abstract

We analyze persuasion in a model, in which each receiver might buy a direct access to the sender's signal or to rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher slant increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or nearly one, but not in-between. The impact of the network density depends on this probability as well.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, networks, percolation, Propaganda

JEL Classification: D85, L82, P16

Suggested Citation

Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, Persuasion on Networks (May 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13723, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387312

Georgy Egorov (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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