Persuasion on Networks

44 Pages Posted: 13 May 2019

See all articles by Georgy Egorov

Georgy Egorov

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; NBER

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris Public Policy; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2019

Abstract

We analyze persuasion in a model, in which each receiver (of many) might buy a direct access to the sender's signal or to rely on her network connections to get the same information. For the sender, a more biased signal increases the impact per subscriber (direct receiver), yet diminishes the willingness of agents to become subscribers. Contrary to the naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally located agents, and is at its maximum level when the probability that information flows between agents is either zero, or nearly one, but not in-between. The density of the network has a non-monotonic effect on the optimal level of propaganda as well.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, networks, percolation, Propaganda

JEL Classification: D85, L82

Suggested Citation

Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin, Persuasion on Networks (May 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13723. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387312

Georgy Egorov (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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