Attacking and Defending Multiple Valuable Secrets in a Big Data World

33 Pages Posted: 14 May 2019 Last revised: 28 Jun 2019

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 14, 2019

Abstract

This paper studies the attack-and-defence game between a web user and a whole set of players over this user’s ‘valuable secrets.’ The number and type of these valuable secrets are the user’s private information. Attempts to tap information as well as privacy protection are costly. The multiplicity of secrets is of strategic value for the holders of these secrets. Users with few secrets keep their secrets private with some probability, even though they do not protect them. Users with many secrets protect their secrets at a cost that is smaller than the value of the secrets protected. The analysis also accounts for multiple redundant information channels with cost asymmetries, relating the analysis to attack-and-defence games with a weakest link.

Keywords: big-data, privacy, web user, conflict, information rents, valuable secrets, attack-and-defence

JEL Classification: D18, D72, D74, D82

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Attacking and Defending Multiple Valuable Secrets in a Big Data World (May 14, 2019). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3387826

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

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Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, 53072
Germany

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