Increasing Market Power and Merger Control

Competition Law & Policy Debate, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 26-35, 2019

16 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2019 Last revised: 16 Jun 2019

See all articles by Tommaso M. Valletti

Tommaso M. Valletti

Imperial College Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Hans Zenger

European Union - Directorate General for Competition

Date Written: May 14, 2019

Abstract

A significant body of empirical research has documented a structural increase in margins across a wide range of industries and countries. This article analyses the potential implications of this trend for merger control. We argue that structural increases in firms’ pricing power call for a pro-active assessment of potential competition cases and increased vigilance when reviewing horizontal concentrations more generally.

Keywords: increasing market power, merger control, potential competition

JEL Classification: K21, L41

Suggested Citation

Valletti, Tommaso M. and Zenger, Hans, Increasing Market Power and Merger Control (May 14, 2019). Competition Law & Policy Debate, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 26-35, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3387999

Tommaso M. Valletti

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Hans Zenger (Contact Author)

European Union - Directorate General for Competition ( email )

Place Madou, Madouplein 1
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode/Sint-Joost-ten-Noode
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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