Voice and Punishment: A Global Survey Experiment on Tax Morale

29 Pages Posted: 16 May 2019 Last revised: 1 Aug 2019

See all articles by Fredrik Matias Sjoberg

Fredrik Matias Sjoberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jonathan Mellon

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Tiago Carneiro Peixoto

World Bank

Johannes Zacharias Hemker

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Lily Lee Tsai

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: May 15, 2019

Abstract

An online survey experiment spanning 50 countries finds sizable improvements in tax morale when (a) the salience of anti-corruption efforts is increased and (b) citizens are allowed to voice their expenditure preferences to the government. These results hold very broadly across a uniquely large and diverse sample of respondents from all continents. The findings are consistent with theories emphasizing the role of democratic accountability, as well as of perceptions of legitimacy and "retributive justice," in generating voluntary tax compliance. Implications and avenues for further research are discussed.

Keywords: Tax Administration, Taxation & Subsidies, Macro-Fiscal Policy, Economic Adjustment and Lending, Legal Products, Judicial System Reform, Youth and Governance, Legal Reform, Legislation, Regulatory Regimes, Public Sector Economics, Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction, Government Policies, National Governance, Social Policy, Tax Law

Suggested Citation

Sjoberg, Fredrik Matias and Mellon, Jonathan and Peixoto, Tiago Carneiro and Hemker, Johannes Zacharias and Tsai, Lily Lee, Voice and Punishment: A Global Survey Experiment on Tax Morale (May 15, 2019). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8855, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3389018

Fredrik Matias Sjoberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Jonathan Mellon

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Tiago Carneiro Peixoto (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Johannes Zacharias Hemker

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Lily Lee Tsai

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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