Helping Under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives

31 Pages Posted: 21 May 2019

See all articles by Anastasia Danilov

Anastasia Danilov

University of Cologne

Bernd Irlenbusch

University of Cologne

Christine Harbring

University of Cologne; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.

Keywords: help, relative rewards, team incentives, experiment

JEL Classification: M52, J33, J41, L23, C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Danilov, Anastasia and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Harbring, Christine, Helping Under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives. IZA Discussion Paper No. 12267, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390257 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3390257

Anastasia Danilov (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Bernd Irlenbusch

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Christine Harbring

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
+ 49 (0) 221 / 470 - 7955 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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