Damages Regimes on Both Sides of the Atlantic: An Economic Critique

Maier-Rigaud, Frank (2017) Damages Regimes on Both Sides of the Atlantic: An Economic Critique, Antitrust Bulletin, 62(2), 334-347.

30 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2019

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics; IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Date Written: January 19, 2017

Abstract

The principles underlying the quantification of damage are universal. Differences between jurisdictions therefore do not originate in economics. In a cartel, the damage of direct purchasers arises from the portion of the price increase that is not passed on to indirect purchasers together with the lost margin of those sales that are no longer made due to the price increase. Actual harm suffered has economically been properly captured when both amounts are allowed to accrue compounded interest until compensation. This article discusses the variable permeation of these economic insights in EU and U.S. law. In fact, the reasons for the limited influence of economics appear to stem from coincidences and path dependencies. Notably the normative effects of the specific circumstances of the first U.S. damages case going back to a bid rigging case in the nineteenth century and the prevalence of U.S. literature when the EU devised its framework.

Keywords: overcharge, compensation, deterrence, damage, quantification of damage, illegal gain

JEL Classification: K21, K40, L40

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P., Damages Regimes on Both Sides of the Atlantic: An Economic Critique (January 19, 2017). Maier-Rigaud, Frank (2017) Damages Regimes on Both Sides of the Atlantic: An Economic Critique, Antitrust Bulletin, 62(2), 334-347., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390830

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

ABC economics ( email )

Berlin, 10115
Germany
10115 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ABCecon.com

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

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