Google’s (Forgotten) Monopoly – Ad Technology Services on the Open Web

19 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last revised: 16 Dec 2019

See all articles by Damien Geradin

Damien Geradin

Geradin Partners; Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; University College London - Faculty of Laws

Dimitrios Katsifis

Geradin Partners

Date Written: May 21, 2019

Abstract

This paper focuses on online display advertising, whereby publishers display advertisements on their website against remuneration. This form of advertising represents a critically important source of revenues for publishers, from large news organisations to online game producers to blogs, offering valuable content to Internet users. Given the importance of online display advertising to publishers, it is no wonder that this area has been the subject of intense discussion among stakeholders and has raised the attention of competition authorities. In particular, concerns have expressed that publishers do not receive their fair share of advertising revenues due to the large fees that are captured by the “ad tech” companies intermediating between advertisers and publishers. This paper provides an overview of the online display advertising landscape, and explores whether Google, the leading ad tech providers, has engaged in potential exclusionary and exploitative conduct.

Keywords: Online advertising, display advertising, advertisers, publishers, auctions, ad exchange, header bidding, AMP, digital platforms, ad tech, big data, Google, competition law, abuses of a dominant position, exploitation, vertical foreclosure, self-preferencing

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L41, L86

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and Katsifis, Dimitrios, Google’s (Forgotten) Monopoly – Ad Technology Services on the Open Web (May 21, 2019). TILEC Discussion Paper, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3391913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3391913

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Geradin Partners ( email )

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Brussels
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Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
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United Kingdom

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

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Dimitrios Katsifis

Geradin Partners ( email )

Avenue Louise 475
Brussels
Belgium

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