A Bargaining Theory of Malevolence: The 2019 Pulwama War

CASS Working Papers on Economics & National Affairs, EC004UC

25 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2019

See all articles by Usman W. Chohan

Usman W. Chohan

UNSW Business School; Critical Blockchain Research Initiative (CBRI); Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS)

Date Written: May 23, 2019

Abstract

Economic theorizations of malevolence as laid out in Bargaining Theory (Anderton and Carter 2009) have discussed how grievances over perceived injustices can alter the utility functions, settlement net resources, and therefore the propensity and calculus of war between two nations. To put this assertion to the test, this working paper examines the Pulwama War and the India-Pakistan standoff of 2019 from a malevolence perspective. It also contrasts this with political bias in bargaining theory (Chohan 2019) in the same case study. The findings of the working paper indicate that the Indian government’s expediency of war may resonate with a malevolence perspective, but the political bias of bargaining theory, as theorized in the game-theoretic economic literature, has greater explanatory power and relevance.

Keywords: Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, Economics, Conflict, War, Defense Economics, Pulwama, India-Pakistan Relations

Suggested Citation

Chohan, Usman W., A Bargaining Theory of Malevolence: The 2019 Pulwama War (May 23, 2019). CASS Working Papers on Economics & National Affairs, EC004UC. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392637 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392637

Usman W. Chohan (Contact Author)

UNSW Business School ( email )

UNSW Business School
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Critical Blockchain Research Initiative (CBRI) ( email )

Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) ( email )

Rawalpindi
Pakistan

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
12
Abstract Views
135
PlumX Metrics