Theories of Executive Remuneration

Economics and Management, XVІ(1): 10-18

9 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2019

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

The aim of the article is to present the theories of remuneration. Both classical and modern theories are presented within their time and economic environment. The anchor of article is the model principal-agent and reducing asymmetric information through remuneration. The conclusions of the article define a wide range of theories. All theories aim to solve the principal-agent problem through a new tool - the remuneration. The nuances of individual theories can be determined from the different periods of their occurrence and from the dominant economic environment for the essence of the remuneration.

Keywords: corporate governance, information asymmetry, principal-agent

JEL Classification: D82, G35, J33, M12

Suggested Citation

Nedelchev, Miroslav, Theories of Executive Remuneration (2019). Economics and Management, XVІ(1): 10-18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3394387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394387

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