Pyramids

10 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2002  

Marianne Bertrand

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Sendhil Mullainathan

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 25, 2002

Abstract

Most corporate finance models of firm behavior study the typical US corporation: one firm with a large set of dispersed shareholders. In contrast, in many countries around the world, firms are often held in groups with complicated ownership structures. These groups, often referred to as pyramids, raise very distinct questions about firm behavior; these questions that are especially relevant for developing countries where these groups are most prevalent. In this paper, we first describe some empirical research we have performed on the nature of agency problems within pyramids. We then discuss a variety of questions, both theoretical and empirical, that remain to be unexplored.

Keywords: Pyramids, Corporate Governance, Development

JEL Classification: J3

Suggested Citation

Bertrand, Marianne and Mullainathan, Sendhil, Pyramids (September 25, 2002). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-32. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=339480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.339480

Marianne Bertrand

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-5943 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/marianne.bertrand/vita/cv_0604.pdf

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-588-0341 (Phone)
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Sendhil Mullainathan (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2720 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-588-1473 (Phone)
617-876-2742 (Fax)

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