Information Aggregation with Runoff Voting

35 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019

See all articles by Nikolas Tsakas

Nikolas Tsakas

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: May 27, 2019

Abstract

A majority of independent voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches the state of the world, but may disagree on its identity due to private information. When we have an arbitrary number of alternatives and also sophisticated partisan voters exist in the electorate, the election of the correct alternative is a real challenge. Building upon McLennan (1998) and Barelli et al. (2017) we show that runoff voting- one of the most intuitive electoral systems - achieves asymptotically full information equivalence. That is, when the society is large, it can lead to the election of the correct alternative under fairly general assumptions regarding the information structure and partisans' preferences.

Keywords: runoff voting, information aggregation, partisan voters, Condorcet jury theorem

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Tsakas, Nikolas and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Information Aggregation with Runoff Voting (May 27, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3394890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394890

Nikolas Tsakas (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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