Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship

70 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2002 Last revised: 1 May 2022

See all articles by Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nicholas Bloom

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Rachel Griffith

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); University of Manchester; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Peter Howitt

Brown University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard W. Blundell

UCL; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovation. A growth model is developed in which competition may increase the incremental profit from innovating; on the other hand, competition may also reduce innovation incentives for laggards. There are four key predictions. First, the relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovation is an inverted U-shape. Second, the equilibrium degree of technological neck-and-neckness' among firms should decrease with PMC. Third, the higher the average degree of neck-and-neckness' in an industry, the steeper the inverted-U relationship. Fourth, firms may innovate more if subject to higher debt-pressure, especially at lower levels of PMC. We confront these predictions with data on UK firms' patenting activity at the US patenting office. They are found to accord well with observed behavior.

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Bloom, Nicholas and Griffith, Rachel and Howitt, Peter and Blundell, Richard W., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship (October 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9269, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=339500

Philippe Aghion (Contact Author)

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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Nicholas Bloom

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://economics.stanford.edu/faculty/bloom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Rachel Griffith

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )

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University of Manchester ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ifs.org.uk/people/profile?id=37

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Peter Howitt

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

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401-863-1970 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Richard W. Blundell

UCL ( email )

Department of Economics
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+44 20 7916 2773 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctp39a/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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