Beyond Norms: Using International Economic Tools to Deter Malicious State-Sponsored Cyber Activities

13 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019

See all articles by Kathleen Claussen

Kathleen Claussen

University of Miami School of Law; Georgetown University Law Center, Institute of International Economic Law

Date Written: December 1, 2018

Abstract

This Comment, an invited contribution for a symposium on cyber & international law, develops innovative tools for addressing cyber issues through international economic law. In thinking about strategy and doctrine for cyberspace, one cannot ignore either the cyber domain's interaction with other domains or the applicability of existing legal tools to address cyberspace issues. This Comment focuses on the latter and argues that any discussion regarding deterrence and a playbook for consequences for cyber incidents by state actors ought necessarily to include a careful examination of existing plays, particularly where those incidents have an economic component as many do. Focusing on multilateral institutions, regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, and unilateral tariff and non-tariff trade and investment tools, this Comment maintains that current and available international economic tools offer significant potential to shape cyber activities and norms and only now are beginning to be deployed this way.

Keywords: cyber, international economic law, sanctions, trade law, cyberspace

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Claussen, Kathleen, Beyond Norms: Using International Economic Tools to Deter Malicious State-Sponsored Cyber Activities (December 1, 2018). Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 113, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395176

Kathleen Claussen (Contact Author)

University of Miami School of Law ( email )

1311 Miller Dr
Coral Gables, FL 33146
United States

Georgetown University Law Center, Institute of International Economic Law ( email )

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