Well-Defined Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Economic Efficiency Applied to Law

27 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019 Last revised: 15 Jun 2019

See all articles by Richard O. Zerbe

Richard O. Zerbe

University of Washington - Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs; University of Washington - School of Law

Date Written: May 29, 2019

Abstract

This article addresses the question of what economic efficiency is and why a proper understanding of it affects the economic efficiency claim that is made for common law. This understanding shows that a good deal of the criticism of the efficiency claim in fact are consistent with it. Justice and economic efficiency, properly defined have similar outcomes and similar and comparable roots so that a correspondence between them is not surprising. This article builds on the Rubin-Zywicki model to suggest additional support for elements of the efficiency claim and shows also additional reasons why it may be less strong than formerly. For example, the common law in its distributive role, where efficiency is often opaque so that the cost to judges of making rules that are inefficient are less than in other areas of the law, inefficiency is more likely to be found.

Keywords: efficiency, common law, well-defined efficiency

JEL Classification: K, K30, K20, K12, K13

Suggested Citation

Zerbe, Richard O., Well-Defined Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Economic Efficiency Applied to Law (May 29, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395580 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3395580

Richard O. Zerbe (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs ( email )

Box 353055
Seattle, WA 98125
United States
206-616-5470 (Phone)

University of Washington - School of Law

William H. Gates Hall
Box 353020
Seattle, WA 98105-3020
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
11
Abstract Views
38
PlumX Metrics